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We consider Cournot competition in the presence of congestion effects. Our model consists of several service
providers with differentiated services, competing for users who are sensitive to both prices and congestion.
We distinguish two types of congestion effects, depending on whether spillover costs exist, that is, one service
provider’s congestion cost increases with other providers’ output level. We quantify the efficiency of an
unregulated oligopoly with respect to the optimal social welfare with tight upper and lower bounds. We show
that when there is no spillover, the welfare loss in an unregulated oligopoly is limited to 25% of the social
optimum, even in the presence of highly convex costs. On the other hand, when spillover cost is present,
there does not exists a constant lower bound on the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly, even with affine
cost. We show that the efficiency depends on the relative magnitude between the marginal spillover cost and
the marginal benefit to consumers.
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1. Introduction
With rapid proliferation of content-rich multimedia devices such as smartphones and tablet PCs,
wireless congestion has increasingly become a common problem in many urban areas. Users in
the affected network would experience spotty services, dropped calls, and sluggish data speeds.
In the United States, the Federal Communication Committee (FCC) is responsible for allocating
spectrum bands. In one of its recent studies (FCC Technical Paper 2010), it predicted that the
demand for wireless bandwidth would grow between 25 and 50 times the current levels within the
next 5 years and surpass the available spectrum by as early as 2014. Given the finite bandwidth, one
may wonder what kind of measure FCC should take to control congestion and ensure an efficient
usage of this limited resource.
Another area routinely plagued by congestion is airports. According to the Bureau of Trans-
portation Statistics, in July 2009, 30% of all domestic flights in the U.S. arrived late, up from
20% in July 2005. The Joint Economic Committee Report (2008) reported that flight delays cost
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passengers, airlines and the U.S. economy more than $40 billion every year. Current landing fees
across the U.S. typically only depend on aircraft weight and do not vary with traffic. Given that
the existing system is unlikely to promote an efficient use of the scarce runway space, it prompts
for other mechanisms to alleviate the widespread problem of airport congestion across the country.
One common feature in the two examples mentioned above is oligopolistic competition with
congestion effects. In the example of wireless communication, as of the fourth quarter in 2013, Ver-
izon, AT&T, Sprint, Nextel, and T-Mobile together control nearly 93% of the U.S. market. While
airports vary in sizes, a small number of airlines usually dominates an airport in terms of flight
share. For both industries, Cournot model, also known as quantity competition, has received both
theoretical and empirical support as a good modeling choice. Theoretically, Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983) show that Cournot models best approximate the long run results of two-stage competition
with capacity choice followed by price setting: Airlines compete by first setting schedules and later
set prices to fill seats; wireless service providers first purchase bandwidth and then determine prices
for subscriptions. Empirical works, including Weisman (1990), Brander and Zhang (1990, 1993),
Oum et al. (1993), Parker and Roller (1997) and Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000), also support
Cournot models reflecting actual competition in these two industries.
We would like to point out a subtle difference associated with congestion effects in the two
examples: As wireless service providers use different frequency bands to reduce signal interference,
congestion experienced with one carrier does not affect others. Congestion effect in this case is fully
self-contained, i.e., the cost associated with one service provider only depends on his output level,
such as the amount of bandwidth consumed. On the other hand, when one airline schedules an
additional flight in a congested airport, it creates additional delays for every flight which is landing
and taking off. Thus, for the airport example, besides self-contained cost, there also exists spillover
cost, where an increase in one’s output level also increases others’ delay.
In this paper, we study both settings, depending on the presence of spillover cost. We evaluate the
efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly by comparing its welfare to the social optimum, which can be
achieved through implementing congestion pricing. Our model consists of users, service providers
and a facility manager: Users are sensitive to both prices and congestion; service providers compete
for users with differentiated services by adjusting the output level; the facility manager imposes
an admission level pricing scheme on service providers, with the goal to improve societal welfare.
Relating this model to the two examples, FCC could play the role of the facility manager and
determines a unit price for bandwidth allocated to each wireless carrier, who in turn determines
how many users to enroll. Similarly, FAA would be responsible for imposing a landing fee and each
airline determines its flight frequency subsequently.
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1.1. Contributions
Incentive alignment through congestion pricing We use an admission-level pricing scheme as
a mechanism to coordinate the actions of profit-maximizing oligopolists with the goal to maximize
social welfare. We show that when costs are fully self-contained, the facility manager must provide
subsidies as service providers tend to underproduce compared to the social optimum. Moreover, the
facility manager does not need to explicitly manage congestion as service providers have taken the
effect into account when they optimize their output level. When spillover costs are present, service
providers could still be entitled to subsides when their services offer more benefits to users relative
to the congestion cost. The facility manager only needs to issue a penalty when the congestion
cost which a service provider imposes onto others outweighs consumer surplus contributed by his
services.
Efficiency analysis to quantify welfare loss We compare the total welfare in an unregulated
oligopoly where service providers have free access to the facility to the social optimal welfare, so
as to assess how much efficiency is lost due to the lack of coordination. We show that with self-
contained costs, the maximum efficiency loss in an unregulated oligopoly is limited to 25% of the
optimal welfare, even in the presence of nonlinear costs. On the other hand, when spillover cost is
present, there does not exist a constant lower bound on the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly,
even with affine cost. In particular, we show that when the marginal spillover cost associated with
enrolling an additional user exceeds the increase in consumer surplus, the efficiency loss in an
unregulated oligopoly could be significant.
Identification of key performance indicators and justification of coordination In the
absence of spillover cost, we show that efficiency of the unregulated oligopoly improves as com-
petition among service providers increases. The result implies the limited role that coordination
could play from a societal view point. With spillover cost, we show that the efficiency depends
on the external cost-to-benefit ratio, which measures the severity of congestion by comparing the
marginal spillover cost and the marginal consumer surplus. All things being equal, a higher exter-
nal cost-to-benefit ratio indicates a larger welfare loss in the unregulated setting. It implies greater
benefits that coordination could bring, thus, making congestion pricing more desirable.
Tight analytical bounds with novel proof techniques Our modeling choice is made in the
context of service industries that compete with quantities and experience congestion. We present
conditions and classes of cost functions for which the analytical bounds in the efficiency analysis
are tight. We develop the analysis by utilizing tools such as Jacobian similarity, copositivity and
spectral theorem from matrix analysis. We believe the methodology proposed in this work could
potentially be used in other settings that incorporate asymmetric competition and nonlinear costs.
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1.2. Related literature
Motivated by congestion management in transportation and communication networks, there has
been a huge body of literature to analyze traffic in a congested network (e.g., Hamdouch et al.
2007, Hayrapetyan et al. 2007 and Maille and Stier-Moses 2009). Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007,
Ozdaglar 2008 study competition among profit-maximizing oligopolists who set prices on the links
and congestion cost on each link only depends on its traffic volume. Recently, in the operations
management literature, several papers have addressed the issue of congestion in service industries
(see for example, Allon and Federgruen 2007, 2008, Cachon and Harker 2002, Johari et al. 2010,
etc), where each firm is only sensitive to congestion caused by his users. A common method to
describe users behavior in congestion models is by the Wardrop equilibrium (e.g., Johari et al. 2010,
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007), also known as single modal traffic equilibrium in the transportation
literature (Wardrop 1952). It implies that with identical or perfectly substitutable services, all users
will choose the service provider who offers the lowest price. Our model differentiates itself from prior
work by incorporating new features, such as asymmetric oligopolists with differentiated services.
We consider the general Wardrop equilibrium, an extension introduced by Dafermos (1982), that
describes a multimodal traffic network equilibrium. The equilibrium conditions imply that several
prices could exist when service providers offer imperfect substitutes.
Besides the traditional network setting and applications with only self-contained costs, congestion
pricing has also been proposed to address airport delays where spillover costs exist. Daniel (1995,
2001) demonstrate the potential benefits of congestion pricing for an airport via a simulation
model based on stochastic queuing theory. Brueckner (2002) argues that airport congestion pricing
is different from road tolls as each road user is small relative to total traffic, in contrast to the
observation that airlines have market power. The author shows, among other things, that airlines
internalize some congestion cost based on a symmetric duopoly and generalizes the result to a
network setting in Brueckner (2005). In this work, we model congestion pricing as a “coordinating
contract” between airlines and a facility manager, with the goal to quantify the benefits in terms
of social welfare that such a scheme can offer.
As our work measures the performance of an unregulated setting with respect to a centralized
system, it is closely related to a stream of literature on price of anarchy, popularized by Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou (1999). It compares the performance of the worst Nash outcome with respect
to the centralized solution. The concept has been used in transportation networks (Roughgarden
and Tardos 2002, Correa et al. 2004, 2007, Roughgarden 2005, Perakis 2007), network pricing
(Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007, Johari et al. 2010), single-tier oligopolistic pricing games (Farahat
and Perakis 2010a,b, Kluberg and Perakis 2012), and supply chain games (Perakis and Roels 2007,
Martinez-de Alberniz and Simchi-Levi 2009, Perakis and Sun 2012).
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A common feature across Farahat and Perakis (2010a,b), Kluberg and Perakis (2012) (which
will be referred to as KP), Perakis and Sun (2012) and this paper is that part of analysis utilizes
tools from matrix analysis to study an asymmetric game with multiple players. All prior work
aforementioned (with the exception of KP) study Bertrand (also known as price competition)
as opposed to Cournot competition. Unfortunately, the results and insights, as well as the proof
techniques, generally do not transfer from the price to the quantity competition setting (see Farahat
and Perakis 2011 for a discussion on how the two settings differ). Between KP and this work, there
are several distinctions. In terms of the model, KP focuses on a single-tier oligopoly while our model
also considers users who are both price and delay sensitive. Secondly, KP uses constant marginal
cost while we consider nonlinear costs. In addition, we also consider the setting with spillover cost.
Thirdly, KP only focuses on the worst-case analysis with a lower bound on the performance, we also
determine the best case with parametric bounds that indicate the key drivers in the unregulated
oligopoly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model and assump-
tions used in the paper. Section 3 presents the efficiency analysis for the setting with fully self-
contained costs, while Section 4 focuses on the setting where spillover costs also exist. We evaluate
the tightness of the bounds in Section 5 and conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. Problem Formulation
We consider a facility with n differentiated services, each offered by a provider. We denote qi as
the output level chosen by service provider i = 1, . . . , n. Given an output level q = (q1, . . . , qn),
we denote the marginal utility derived from consumption as u(q) = (u1(q), . . . , un(q)). One can
interpret ui(q) as the additional utility of service i obtained by an infinitesimal user as when the
facility maintains a service level q. As is traditional in the pricing literature (see Vives 1999), we
consider the marginal utility function as a affine function of output level:
u(q) = p¯−Bq =
 p1...
pn
−
 β11 . . . β1n... . . . ...
βn1 . . . βnn

 q1...
qn
 ,
where p = (p1, . . . , pn) represents the maximum prices that a user is willing to pay for the services.
Different pi captures the quality differences perceived by consumers, which could be affected by
factors such as brand recognition, word-of-mouth effects, prior experience with the product, etc.
Assumption 1. Matrix B is a symmetric and positive definite matrix. In addition, βii > 0 for
all i, βij ≥ 0 for all j 6= i.
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The assumption implies that ∂ui(q)/∂qi < 0, i.e., each service faces a downward sloping demand
resulted from users’ diminishing return from consumption. Meanwhile, ∂ui(q)/∂qj ≤ 0 suggests
that service i and j are “strategic substitutes” (Bulow et al. 1985). Symmetry of the matrix is a
natural consequence of maximizing a quasilinear utility function of a representative consumer.
In a congested facility, both users and service providers are affected by congestion. For the case
of airport congestion, airlines have to pay extra for crew, fuel, and maintenance costs while delayed
travelers and their employers lose productivity, business opportunities and leisure activities. Let
lpi (q) and l
u
i (q) denote the congestion cost per service incurred by the service provider i and his
users respectively. Let li(q) = l
p
i (q) + l
u
i (q) represent the aggregate congestion cost per i’s service.
When service provider i enrolls qi users, total congestion cost associated with i and his users is
li(q)qi. Given l(q) = (l1(q), · · · , ln(q)), the total congestion cost in the facility is given by qT l(q).
Assumption 2. For every i, the cost function li(q) is convex, component-wise non-decreasing,
and continuously differentiable with respect to qj, for all j = 1, . . . , n.
Denote the Jacobian matrix of l(q) as R =
 r11 · · · r1n... . . . ...
rn1 · · · rnn
 , where rij = ∂li/∂qj. Except for affine
cost functions, the Jacobian matrix R depends on the value of q. We will use superscripts to
differentiate the matrix evaluated at different values of q.
Next, we formally define the two types of congestion cost studied in this work.
Definition 1. Self-contained cost, ∂li/∂qi ≥ 0 for all i∈ {1, . . . , n}. Spillover cost, ∂li/∂qj ≥
0 for all j 6= i.
Denote the diagonal and off-diagonal elements of the Jacobian matrix R as ΓR and Roff respec-
tively. We distinguish two settings, depending on the existence of spillover cost. When there is no
spillover cost, the cost associated with service i only depends on i’s output level. It implies that
the Jacobian matrix on cost is simply a diagonal matrix, i.e., R = ΓR. In the setting with spillover
costs, i.e., an increase in i’s output level can induce to an increase in j’s cost. The spillover cost is
captured by Roff .
Assumption 3. The maximum reservation price must satisfy, p¯− l(0)> 0.
The assumption states that the maximum profit per service must be positive. If this assumption is
violated, it implies that no user is willing to pay for the service and this corresponding “inactive”
service provider could be removed from the equilibrium.
For the analysis with spillover cost, we use the following assumption.
Assumption 4. The Jacobian matrix of the cost function l(q), R, is symmetric. Denote the
Jacobian matrix of (l′1(q), . . . , l
′
n(q)) as H, where l
′
i(q) = ∂li/∂qi is positive quasi-definite (i.e.,
H + HT is positive definite).
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Assumption 4 imposes restrictions on the Jacobian and Hessian matrix of the cost function l(q).
Note that when service providers have the same congestion cost per-service li(q), the assumption
is in fact not necessary. For example, consider a M/M/1 facility which is shared by the service
providers, where the cost per unit time is c the maximum capacity is µ. The average delay cost in
such a system is given by li(q) = c/(µ−
∑
i qi), for all i. Then one can show that both R and H
are rank-1 positive semidefinite matrices which satisfy Assumption 4.
This assumption simplifies the derivation in the analysis with spillover cost as R = RT and the
condition on the Hessian matrix ensures the uniqueness of the solution in the unregulated setting.
It is possible to relax it to some extent, but it involves more tedious derivations. As a result, we
impose this assumption to enhance the transparency of the model.
2.1. Three-tier model
Our model consists of three key players: users, service providers and a facility manager. Users
select service providers by taking into account of the price and congestion. Every service provider
is a profit maximizer who competes with differentiated services by adjusting his output level. The
facility manager imposes an access fee on service providers, with the goal to improve societal
welfare. The three-stage problem is solved with backward induction. We now present the problem
faced by each player and characterize the respective outocme.
2.1.1. User behavior A user’s total disutility associated with using service i is the sum of the
price he pays pi and the congestion cost he experiences l
u
i (q). The expression pi + l
u
i (q) is known
as full price or effective price in the literature (Johari et al. 2010, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007).
We assume that each user is “small” compared to the total traffic volume in the sense that when
he switches from a service provider to another, there is no considerable change in the congestion
cost. To model users’ behavior of choosing differentiated services, we use a multimodal traffic
network equilibrium analogy with elastic demands. The resulting equilibrium is also known as the
general Wardrop equilibrium in the transportation literature (Beckmann et al. 1956, Dafermos
1982): A vector of output level q is a general Wardrop equilibrium (GWE), if for every service
provider i,
pi + l
u
i (q) = ui(q), if qi > 0;
pi + l
u
i (q) ≥ ui(q), if qi = 0.
The equilibrium conditions state that for every active provider whose service level is positive, his
full price must be equal to the marginal utility function obtained in the equilibrium.
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Remark 1. In a setting with a single type of service or symmetric service providers, ui(q) = u(q)
for all i. GWE implies that a single full price prevails in an equilibrium. Intuitively, with perfectly
substitutable services, when one provider charges a higher full price, all his users would switch
to other providers. With differentiated services, different full prices could coexist in a market as
service providers leverage product differentiation.
Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to these active service providers with qi > 0,
whose fare prices follow
pi = ui(q)− lui (q). (1)
When there is no congestion, the market clearing price of an active service is simply its marginal
utility function, i.e., pi = ui(q). The presence of congestion directly lowers users’ willingness to pay
and service providers’ profitability.
2.1.2. Service provider’s profit maximization problem Service provider i’s profit func-
tion is defined as pii(qi,q−i) = qi(pi(qi,q−i)− ti − lpi (qi,q−i)), where q−i are the service levels set
by i’s competitors and ti is the access fee per service imposed by the facility manager. Following
Equation (1) which describes the users’ behavior, we obtain the profit function
pii(qi,q−i) = qi(ui(qi,q−i)− lui (qi,q−i))− ti− lpi (qi,q−i))
= qi(ui(qi,q−i)− ti− li(qi,q−i)). (2)
The dynamics between the facility manager and the service providers are modeled as a Stackel-
berg game. The facility manager announces the access fee per service, t, and the service providers
then determine their appropriate output level, q(t). We assume service providers behave according
to a subgame perfect equilibrium. That is, for a fixed access fee ti, service provider i determines his
service level to maximize his profit, given the service level set by his competitors.
2.1.3. Facility manager’s welfare maximization problem The goal of the facility man-
ager is to maximize the total social welfare (W ), obtained by aggregating consumer surplus (CS),
producer surplus (PS) and revenue collected from access fee (TR), i.e., W =CS+PS+TR.
Consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the total utility derived from consuming
q units of services and the total cost incurred by users. The total utility for an affine marginal
utility function is given by
∫
q
u(x)dx = qT (p¯− 1
2
Bq). The total cost is equivalent to the full price
that users perceive, qTu(q). Thus, consumer surplus can be written as
CS = qT (p¯− 1
2
Bq)−qTu(q) = qT (p¯− 1
2
Bq)−qT (p¯−Bq) = 1
2
qTBq.
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Producer surplus is the total profit generated by all service providers,
PS =
∑
i
pii(q) = q
T (u(q)− l(q)− t) = qT (p¯−Bq− l(q)− t).
Revenue collected from congestion pricing is captured by TR = qT t. Combining all three terms,
the total welfare is given by the following,
W (q) = qT (p¯− 1
2
Bq− l(q)). (3)
Under Assumptions 1 to 4, the regulator’s problem (3) is a strictly concave optimization problem
with respect to the output level q, where q∗ = argmaxqW (q). To achieve the maximum welfare
W (q∗) in the three-level model, the facility manager can use the access fees so that the desirable
service level q∗ is achieved, i.e., q(t∗) = q∗. The access fee could be viewed as a “coordinating
contract” that aligns the profit-maximizing objective of service providers to one that maximizes
the societal welfare.
Proposition 1. The access fee per service i is given by ti(q) =−βiiqi +
∑
j 6=i rjiqj, where rji =
∂lj/∂qi.
The access fee consists of two components of opposite signs - a subsidy that is aimed to correct
underproduction and a penalty that targets overproduction by service providers who ignore the
spillover cost imposed on others. In the setting without spillover cost, ti(q) =−βiiqi, implying that
the facility manager has to provide appropriate subsidies to induce the socially optimal output
level. In the setting with spillover cost,
∑
j 6=i rjiqj captures the marginal negative externalities i
has imposed onto others. It is important to note that access fee does not manage self-contained
cost since that service providers have already taken it into consideration when they determine their
output level.
Proposition 1 provides a way of using access fee to achieve the optimal societal welfare. One
natural question arises: What good does it do? Clearly any attempt to implement such a scheme
on an industry-wide scale is certain to face institutional, political and financial challenges. An
answer to the question could help policy makers gauge the need for regulation. In particular, if the
benefit is proven to be substantial for some instances, it may provide some evidences to support its
implementation. In the next subsection, we formulate this question mathematically and introduce
some proxies used in the analysis as the key performance indicators.
2.2. Performance indicators
Efficiency analysis compares the social welfare achieved in an unregulated setting with the social
optimum. It describes how efficient the unregulated setting is from the societal point of view. It
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also helps to pinpoint key factors that drive efficiency in the unregulated setting. This becomes
particularly important when “optimum” might be infeasible to attain in certain applications.
In our context, service providers use the facility for free in the unregulated setting, i.e., t = 0. In
a socially optimal setting, t∗ is implemented, such that the coordinated output level is maximizing
total welfare, i.e., q(t∗) = q∗. Denote qN and q∗ as the output level in the unregulated oligopoly and
that in a social optimum respectively. Let W (qN) and W (q∗) be the corresponding total welfare
attained in these two settings. The quantity of interest for efficiency analysis is W (qN)/W (q∗).
With nonlinear costs, it is generally hard to obtain closed-form solutions in the two settings.
Nonetheless, one can derive optimality conditions that can help quantify the total welfare, as shown
in Proposition 2. Since the Jacobian matrix of the cost function depends on the output level, we
will use R∗ and RN to distinguish the matrix evaluated at q∗ and qN respectively.
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 to 4, there exists unique solutions in the social optimal
and the unregulated settings. They are given by the following,
W (q∗) = (q∗)T
(
1
2
B + R∗
)
q∗, and
W (qN) = (qN)T
(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R
)
qN.
The main focus of this work is on quantifying the efficiency of service industries for two set-
tings depending on the presence of spillover cost. For each setting, we establish a lower bound on
W (qN)/W (q∗) which gives the worst performance guarantee, as well as an upper bound which
sheds some insights on how to improve the performance.
To establish these bounds, one of the machineries from matrix analysis that we utilize is the
concept of Jacobian similarity property.
Definition 2. The Jacobian similarity property. A positive semidefinite matrix F(q) sat-
isfies the property if there exists a constant κ≥ 1 such that for all w,q and q′:
κwTF(q)w≥wTF(q′)w≥ 1
κ
wTF(q)w.
If F(q) is the Jacobian matrix of an affine function such that F(q) is independent of q, the only
κ that satisfies the condition is 1. When matrix F(q) is positive definite for all q, it is easy to
derive a loose bound on this constant based on its definition: κ= maxq
maxi λi{F(q)}
mini λi{F(q)} , which is the
maximum conditional number of the Jacobian matrix. We refer the reader to Perakis (2007) for
more information on this concept. Later in the paper, we will show that it is possible to obtain
bounds on κ without searching through the entire space of q and how this term is related to
nonlinearity of the cost structure.
Author: Price of Anarchy for Cournot Competition in Service Industries with Congestion
Management Science 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS 11
To interpret the bounds in efficiency analysis, we will introduce the following two parameters,
which measure the intensity of competition among service providers and the severity of spillover
costs respectively.
Definition 3. Competition index adjusted with self-contained cost Given a price sen-
sitivity matrix B and self-contained cost ΓR, the competition index for service provider i is defined
γi =
∑
j 6=i βij/βii + 2rii/βii, for all i. Let γ¯ = maxi γi|q=q∗ .
The notion that
∑
j 6=i βij/βii is used to measure the intensity of competition can be found in Sun
(2006), Farahat and Perakis (2010a,b). Suppose every service provider in the market changes his
output level by 1 unit, βii reflects the amount of price change which is solely contributed by i’s
own output change, while
∑
j 6=i βij measures the price change contributed by i’s competitors. A
high value of
∑
j 6=i βij/βii suggests that i’s price is more susceptible to his competitors’ output
change than his own change, implying that service provider i faces a high level of competition.
When
∑
j 6=i βij = 0 for all i, it implies that βij = 0 for all j 6= i. That is, each of service provider
acts as a monopolist and does not face any competition.
When there is self-contained cost (i.e., rii > 0), the competition index also contains the term
rii/βii. It compares the marginal decrease in the revenue per service due to one’s self-contained
cost increase to the decrease due to diminishing returns of the demand. Thus, when rii/βii is large,
it implies that the cost increase is rather steep.
Thus, γi meausres the level of competition faced by service provider i, taking into account the
self-contained cost, i.e., comparing the aggregate price impact from i’s competitors and the self-
contained congestion to the price change solely contributed by i’s output change. With asymmetric
service providers, γi differs across i. With nonlinear cost, γi also depends on the output level q.
We will use γ¯ = maxi γi|q=q∗ to approximate the competition intensity under the optimum output
level.
Definition 4. External cost-to-benefit ratio Given a price sensitivity matrix B and con-
gestion cost R, define ρi =
∑
j 6=i rji/βii, for all i. Let ρ¯= maxi ρi|q=q∗ .
This quantity is nonzero only when spillover cost is present. The numerator
∑
j 6=i rji captures
the marginal spillover cost created by service provider i, and the denominator reflects the addi-
tional consumer surplus when service provider i increases his output. Thus, the term ρi could be
interpreted as the external cost (spillover congestion cost) versus the external benefit (additional
consumer surplus) which service provider i brings to the society. ρ¯ indicates the maximum net
externality in an oligopoly: When ρ¯≤ 1, every service provider is contributing more welfare to the
society than the spillover cost, thus, the net externality remains positive; on the other hand, when
ρ¯ > 1, there exists some service provider whose spillover cost outweighs the external benefit which
he brings to the society, implying negative net externality.
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With nonlinear costs, the external cost-to-benefit ratio depend on q. Similar to the competition
index, this parameter is evaluated at the social optimum. Note that as the welfare maximization
problem is a strictly concave optimization problem, q∗ can be easily computed. We will begin the
analysis for the setting without spillover cost in Section 3. The setting with spillover cost will be
examined in Section 4 .
3. Efficiency Analysis in the Absence of Spillover Cost
Motivated by modern technology-based (e.g., telecommunication, computing) service providers
whose costs are fully self-contained, in this section, we focus on the setting when there is no spillover
cost. The first result compares the output level in the unregulated setting to the optimum.
Proposition 3. In the absence of spillover cost, 1
2
q∗ ≤ qN ≤ q∗.
The proposition states that the output level in the unregulated setting is always below the socially
optimum. This result seemingly contradicts the observation on wireless congestion discussed in the
beginning of the paper. One plausible argument is that Proposition 3 refers to the outcome of a
market that is operating in a static equilibrium, whereas the booming sales of smartphones and
tablets imply a market that is far from being in a steady state. Nevertheless, later in this section,
we will discuss how efficiency analysis reveals the service providers’ attitude towards self-contained
costs and draws connections with recent developments in the wireless communication industry.
3.1. Efficiency analysis
We are going to present our first key result which quantifies the efficiency analysis of the unregulated
oligopoly with a constant lower bound and a parametric upper bound. The proof for the bounds
is shown in Subsection 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.
Theorem 1. In the absence of spillover cost, under Assumptions 1 to 3, total social welfare in
an unregulated oligopoly with nonlinear convex costs is bounded between
3
4
≤ W (q
N)
W (q∗)
≤ κ
(
1− 1
(2 + γ¯)2
)
,
where κ is the Jacobian similarity factor. The lower bound is tight when service providers are
noncompeting and the cost l(q) is independent of q. The upper bound is tight when service providers
are symmetric and l(q) is either independent of q, or an affine function of q (i.e., κ= 1 for both
cases).
Theorem 1 states that when costs are fully self-contained, the unregulated setting achieves at
least 75% of the optimal societal welfare. The worst case for efficiency loss occurs when l(q) is
independent of q (κ= 1) and the service providers are not competing (γ¯ = 0). Notice that for this
particular case, the upper bound and the lower bound in Theorem 1 coincide.
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Figure 1 W (qN)/W (q∗) = 1− 1
(2+γ¯)2
with respect to competition index γ¯ for symmetric service providers with
constant marginal cost, i.e., when cost is independent of output level q.
Figure 1 illustrates the upper bound with respect to the competition index when the cost l(q) is
independent of q. Note that the bound coincides with the exact value of W (qN)/W (q∗) in the case
with symmetric service providers. It shows that the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly increases
as the intensity of competition in the facility increases. When the service providers are independent
with monopolistic power, i.e., γ¯ = 0, the efficiency loss is at its maximum of 25%. As the competition
among the service providers intensifies, the efficiency gap between the unregulated setting and the
social optimum diminishes. For example, when γ¯ = 1, the gap is 11.1%; as γ¯ increases to 2, the gap
reduces to 6.25%. It implies that in industries with a fair amount of competition, the unregulated
setting could be quite efficient.
To explain this behavior, recall that in Proposition 3, we have shown that incentive misalignment
leads to underproduction in the unregulated setting. For a given cost structure, Theorem 1 shows
that the extent of misalignment in incentive is directly related to the market power of service
providers. When service providers have monopolistic power (i.e., no competition), the output level
is at its lowest level with respect to the optimum, resulting in the lowest efficiency. As competition
increases, it reduces the market power of individual service providers, and subsequently shrinks the
efficiency gap. Take perfect competition as an extreme example, where γ¯→∞, the upper bound
in Theorem 1 shows that W (qN)→W (q∗). That is, total welfare obtained under an unregulated
oligopoly converges to that of an fully coordinated setting.
The constant lower bound in Theorem 1 might be surprising at first, especially compared to
other works on congestible games. For example, Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) and Roughgarden
(2005) study the selfish behavior of noncooperative network users. In their setting, the authors
show that performance degrades with nonlinearity of the latency functions. In contrast, we have
shown that the performance degradation caused by noncooperative service providers is bounded,
even with highly nonlinear costs. This is because when the costs are fully self-contained, the service
providers have fully taken the cost impact into consideration while determining the equilibrium
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output. Although our setting restricts to a competing market in an equilibrium state, there are well-
documented evidences suggesting that service providers take full responsibility of self-contained
cost. A recent study (Research and Markets 2013) states that the four largest carriers in the U.S.
are going to to spend $10 billion on infrastructure in 2013 as they are competing to roll out newer
and faster network to meet users’ rising demand for wireless connection. The study forecasts that
the total expenditure on network infrastructure in the U.S. will reach $37.5 billion by 2017.
We would like to point out that in order to compute the upper bound in Theorem 1, it also
requires the knowledge of the Jacobian similarity factor κ . In the proof of the upper bound
(in Section 3.3), we have given a precise definition on κ (see Equation 8). However, despite its
tightness, the definition has a rather complex form and does not offer much insights. We simplify
its expression by giving it an upper bound as shown below.
Proposition 4. Without spillover cost, the Jacobian similarity factor is bounded by κ ≤
maxi
(
l′i(q
∗
i )
l′i(q
N
i )
)2
≤maxi
(
l′i(q
∗
i )
l′i(q
∗
i /2)
)2
, where l′i(·) = ∂li/∂qi.
• For monomial cost, li(qi) = ciqki , where ci is the constant cost coefficient and k is the degree
of nonlinearity, the Jacobian similarity factor is bounded by κ≤ 22(k−1).
• For the M/M/1 model with delay cost, li(qi) = ciµi−qi , where ci is congestion cost per unit time,
µi is i’s service rate and qi is the user arrival rate, then κ≤maxi
(
2µi−q∗i
2(µi−q∗i )
)2
.
The Jacobian similarity factor κ is bounded by the maximum ratio of the marginal cost obtained
in the optimal and the unregulated settings. Clearly, when l(q) is affine in q, since its marginal
cost is the same in the two settings, Proposition 4 shows that κ= 1. We have also presented an
upper bound for two families of cost functions, namely, the monomial and the M/M/1 delay costs.
To do so, we need to have a lower bound on qN and we have used qN ≥ 1/2q∗ from Proposition 3.
In general, one can obtain a better bound on κ by providing a tighter lower bound for qN.
Theorem 1 offers us some comfort in knowing that when costs are fully self-contained, the worst
efficiency loss is bounded and the actual number could be considerably smaller in reality when
competition exists. In the following two subsections, we will present the proof for Theorem 1. We
begin with the analysis for the constant lower bound, and follow by the parametric upper bound.
3.2. Proof of Theorem 1 for the lower bound
The proof heavily utilizes some tools from matrix analysis. This allows us to analyze multiple
asymmetric players and nonlinear cost. To enhance clarity, a proof outline is given as below. It
consists of three key steps.
Step 1: We make use of the convexity of the cost function (Lemma 4 in the Appendix) and the
optimality conditions in Proposition 2 to derive an upper bound on W (q∗) in terms of qN.
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Step 2: We simplify the lower bound for W (qN)/W (q∗) to a composite matrix using eigende-
composition and properties of similar matrices.
Step 3: We establish a constant lower bound on W (qN)/W (q∗) by showing the composite matrix
is copositive1. We establish copositivity by showing that the composite matrix is the product of two
nonnegative matrices. Thus, it is also a nonnegative matrix which is copositive by definition.
Step 1: This step is labeled as Lemma 1, which also holds with spillover costs.
Lemma 1. The optimal societal welfare is bounded from above by the following,
W (q∗)≤ 1
2
(qN)T (B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
N)(B + 2RN)−1(B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
N)qN.
Proof of Lemma 1. Denote Ω = B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
N and Σ = B + R∗+ RN. By Lemma 4, we
have already shown that ΩqN ≥Σq∗. Note that both ΩqN and Σq∗ are two nonnegative vectors.
By Proposition 2,
W (q∗) =(q∗)TΣΣ−1(
1
2
B + R∗)Σ−1Σq∗ ≤ (qN)TΩΣ−1(1
2
B + R∗)Σ−1ΩqN,
where we reach the inequality by replacing Σq∗ by ΩqN. Expand this expression further,
W (q∗)≤1
2
(qN)TΩΣ−1(B + 2R∗)Σ−1ΩqN
=
1
2
(qN)TΩ(B + 2RN)−0.5 (B + 2RN)0.5Σ−1(B + 2R∗)Σ−1(B + 2RN)0.5︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
(B + 2RN)−0.5ΩqN.
By the definition of the eigenvalue, this expression is upper bounded by the maximum eigenvalue
of composite matrix ∆ as follows,
W (q∗)≤ 1
2
λmax{∆}(qN)TΩ(B + 2RN)−1ΩqN (4)
Now let us focus on this composite matrix ∆. By the property of similar matrices, λmax{∆} =
λmax{Σ−1(B + 2R∗)Σ−1(B + 2RN)}. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 4, λmax{∆} ≥ 0 since ∆ is
positive semidefinite. Expand this matrix,
λmax{∆}=λmax{(B + R∗+ RN)−1(B + 2R∗)(B + R∗+ RN)−1(B + 2RN)}
=λmax{
(
I + (B + R∗+ RN)−1(R∗−RN)) (I + (B + R∗+ RN)−1(RN−R∗))}
=λmax{I−
(
(B + R∗+ RN)−1(R∗−RN))2}
=1−λmin{
(
(B + R∗+ RN)−1(R∗−RN))2}.
1 A matrix A is copositive, if for any positive vector x, xTAx ≥ 0. Clearly, every positive semidenite matrix is
copositive, but the converse is false. We refer the reader to Horn and Johnson (1985) for more information.
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It is clear that λmin{((B + R∗+ RN)−1(R∗−RN))2} ≥ 0 because it is also a positive semidefinite
matrix. Thus, λmax{∆} ≤ 1. From Equation (4), we can conclude that W (q∗) ≤ 12(qN)TΩ(B +
2RN)−1ΩqN.
Step 2: With Proposition 2 and Lemma 1, W (qN)/W (q∗) can be lower bounded as follows:
W (qN)
W (q∗)
≥ (q
N)T (B + 2ΓB + 2Γ
N
R)q
N
(qN)T (B + ΓB + ΓNR + R
N)(B + 2RN)−1(B + ΓB + ΓNR + RN)qN
. (5)
In the absence of spillover, RN = ΓNR. Since all quantities are the Nash equilibrium quantities in
this proof, we drop the superscript on matrices for ease of notation:
W (qN)
W (q∗)
≥ (q
N)T (B + 2ΓR + 2ΓB)q
N
(qN)T (B + 2ΓR + ΓB)(B + 2ΓR)−1(B + 2ΓR + ΓB)qN
.
Denote G = Γ−0.5B (B + 2ΓR)Γ
−0.5
B = Γ
−0.5
B B˜Γ
−0.5
B . This is a symmetric, nonnegative positive defi-
nite matrix. We will first rewrite the right hand side of the inequality above in terms of matrix G
and identity matrix I:
(qN)T (B˜ + 2ΓB)q
N
(qN)T (B˜ + ΓB)B˜−1(B˜ + ΓB)qN
=
(qN)TΓ0.5B Γ
−0.5
B (B˜ + 2ΓB)Γ
−0.5
B Γ
0.5
B q
N
(qN)TΓ0.5B Γ
−0.5
B (B˜ + ΓB)B˜
−1(B˜ + ΓB)Γ
−0.5
B Γ
0.5
B q
N
=
(qN)TΓ0.5B (G + 2I)Γ
0.5
B q
N
(qN)TΓ0.5B (G + I)G
−1(G + I)Γ0.5B qN
=
(qN)TΓ0.5B G
−0.5G0.5(G + 2I)G0.5G−0.5Γ0.5B q
N
(qN)TΓ0.5B G
−0.5G0.5(G + I)G−1(G + I)G0.5G−0.5Γ0.5B qN
=
wTG0.5(G + 2I)G0.5w
wTG0.5(G + I)G−1(G + I)G0.5w
, where w = G−0.5Γ0.5B q
N.
Step 3: To show this ratio has a constant lower bound of 3/4, it implies that
4wTG0.5(G + 2I)G0.5w− 3wTG0.5(G + I)G−1(G + I)G0.5w ≥ 0, or equivalently,
wT
(
4G0.5(G + 2I)G0.5− 3G0.5(G + I)G−1(G + I)G0.5)w ≥ 0. (6)
To establish this statement, we will show that the composite matrix in Equation (6) is in fact
copositive. We express it as follows,
4G0.5(G + 2I)G0.5− 3G0.5(G + I)G−1(G + I)G0.5
= 4(G2 + 2G)− 3(G + I)2
= 4G2 + 8G−3G2−6G−3I
= G2 + 2G−3I
= (G− I)(G + 3I). (7)
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Given matrix G is a nonnegative matrix, the second term which is a sum with an identity matrix
is clearly nonnegative. Now consider the first term, G− I. The off-diagonal elements βij/(
√
βiiβij)
are nonnegative under Assumption 2, where βij is the (i, j)
th element of matrix B. Its diagonal
elements are given by (βii + 2rii)/βii = 1 + 2rii/βii ≥ 1, where rii is the ith diagonal element of the
Jacobian matrix R. Therefore, G− I must also be nonnegative. We have shown that the composite
matrix in Equation (6) could be expressed as the product of two nonnegative matrices. Therefore,
this composite matrix must also be nonnegative, and therefore, copositive.
Lastly, to show that the bound is tight, note that with noncompeting service providers, B = ΓB.
Moreover, when l(q) is independent of q, its Jacobian matrix R is 0. Using the equilibrium and
optimality conditions shown in the proof for Lemma 2, it is easy to show that the service level
in the unregulated setting is exactly half of the optimal level, i.e., qN = 1
2
q∗. Substituting this
condition into the welfare objective function in Equation (3), it shows that the ratio is exactly 3/4.
3.3. Proof of Theorem 1 for the upper bound
Instead of a constant bound as shown in the previous section, the upper bound on the efficiency
is a parametric function of the competition index, γ¯, evaluated at the optimal output level q∗.
There are three key steps in the proof, which are outlined as follows. The first two steps (denoted
as Lemmas 2 and 3) continue to hold with spillover costs.
Step 1: We make use of Proposition 2 and the convexity of the cost (Lemma 4) to provide an
upper bound on W (qN). Next, we express W (qN) in terms of the optimal output level q∗ by using
the Jacobian similarity property.
Step 2: We simplify the upper bound of W (qN)/W (q∗) to a composite matrix using eigendecom-
position and the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem.
Step 3: We characterize an upper bound on W (qN)/W (q∗) in terms of the maximum eigenvalue
of a composite matrix. We show that the bound can be simplified by replacing the eigenvalue with
the competition index through Gergsgorin Disc Theorem which bounds the spectrum of any square
matrix.
Step 1:
Lemma 2. The welfare in the unregulated setting is bounded from above by the following,
W (qN)≤ κ(q∗)T (B + 2R∗)(B + ΓB + Γ∗R + R∗)−1(B2 +ΓB + Γ∗R)(B + ΓB + Γ∗R + R∗)−1(B + 2R∗)q∗,
where κ≥ 1 is the Jacobian similarity factor.
Proof of Lemma 2. From Proposition 2, we obtain that
W (qN) = (qN)T (
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)q
N = (qN)TΨΨ−1(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)Ψ
−1ΨqN,
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where Ψ = B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
∗. Making use of Lemma 4 which shows that ΨqN ≤ (B + 2R∗)q∗, it
follows that
W (qN)≤(q∗)T (B + 2R∗)(B + ΓB + ΓNR + RN)−1(
B
2
+ΓB + Γ
N
R)(B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
N)−1(B + 2R∗)q∗
≤κ(q∗)T (B + 2R∗)(B + ΓB + Γ∗R + R∗)−1(
B
2
+ΓB + Γ
∗
R)(B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R + R
∗)−1(B + 2R∗)q∗,
where we obtain the last inequality by using the Jacobian similarity property and κ is defined as
the maximum eigenvalue of a positive definite matrix,
κ≤λmax{(B + ΓB + ΓNR + RN)−2(B + ΓB + Γ∗R + R∗)2(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R)
−1}. (8)
Note that a more intuitive (but less tight) upper bound for κ is given in Proposition 4.
Step 2:
Lemma 3. W (q
N)
W (q∗) ≤ κ(1−λmin{((I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1))2}), where κ≥ 1 is the Jacobian similar-
ity factor, G = Γ−0.5B (B + 2Γ
∗
R)Γ
−0.5
B and Ξ = Γ
−0.5
B R
∗
offΓ
−0.5
B .
Proof of Lemma 3. By combining Lemma 2 and W (q∗) from Proposition 2, we establish an
upper bound on W (qN)/W (q∗) as follows,
W (qN)
W (q∗)
≤ κ (q
∗)T (B + 2R∗)( 1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R)(B + 2R
∗)q∗
(q∗)T (B + ΓB + Γ∗R + R∗)(
1
2
B + R∗)(B + ΓB + Γ∗R + R∗)q∗
.
As all quantities are in the social optimum setting, we will skip the superscript on matrices. Denote
G = Γ−0.5B (B + 2ΓR)Γ
−0.5
B and Ξ = Γ
−0.5
B RoffΓ
−0.5
B , the expression becomes
W (qN)
W (q∗)
≤ κ (q
∗)TΓ0.5B (G + 2I)Γ
0.5
B q
∗
(q∗)TΓ0.5B (G + I + Ξ)(G + 2Ξ)−1(G + I + Ξ)Γ
0.5
B q
∗ .
Using the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem, the upper bound can be simplified as the follows.
W (qN)
W (q∗)
≤κλmax{(G + 2I)(G + I + Ξ)−1(G + 2Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1}
=κλmax{(G + I + Ξ + I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1(G + Ξ + I− I + Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1}
=κλmax{(I + (I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1)(I− (I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1)}
=κλmax{I− ((I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1))2}
=κ(1−λmin{((I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1))2}).
Step 3: In the absence of spillover cost, Roff = 0 or Ξ = 0, and the upper bound in Lemma 3 can
be simplified into
W (qN)
W (q∗)
≤ κ (1−λmin{(G + I)−2})
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= κ
(
1− 1
λmax(G + I)2
)
≤ κ
(
1− 1
(1 +λmax{G})2
)
. (9)
Note G = Γ−0.5B (B + 2ΓR)Γ
−0.5
B is a symmetric, positive definite matrix. By the property of similar
matrices, this matrix is similar to Γ−1B (B + 2ΓR). Thus, they share the same set of eigenvalues.
Using the Gershgorin Disc Theorem, we can upper bound the maximum eigenvalue of a matrix,
i.e.,
λmax{G}= λmax{ΓB−1(B + 2ΓR)} ≤ 1 + max
i
∑
j 6=i βij + 2rii
βii
≤ 1 + max
i
γ∗i = 1 + γ¯.
Substituting these two inequalities into Equation (9), we obtain the desired bound.
In order to show the tightness result, note that when the costs is affine, κ= 1. The inequalities
in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 become equalities. Moreover, with symmetric service providers, γi = γ¯,
for all i, one can show that the maximum eigenvalue of matrix G is exactly equal to 1 + γ¯.
4. Efficiency Analysis in the Presence of Spillover Cost
In the previous section, we have seen that in the absence of spillover cost, the efficiency loss of
an unregulated setting is always bounded by 25% of the optimum welfare, irrespective of the
nonlinearity of cost functions. In this section, we present the efficiency analysis with spillover costs.
This analysis reveals that the efficiency depends heavily on ρ¯ (the maximum external cost-to-benefit
ratio evaluated at the social optimal output level) and the loss in efficiency could be much more
severe for this setting.
Theorem 2. With spillover congestion cost, under Assumptions 1 through 4, the efficiency of
an unregulated oligopoly depends on ρ¯.
(a) When ρ¯≤ 1,
3
4
≤ W (q
N)
W (q∗)
≤ κ
(
1−
(
1− ρ¯
ρ¯+ 2 + γ¯
)2)
,
where κ≥ 1 is the Jacobian similarity factor. The lower bound is tight when service providers are
noncompeting and the cost l(q) is independent of q. The upper bound is tight when service providers
are symmetric and l(q) is either independent of q, or an affine function of q.
(b) When ρ¯≥ 1,
1
κ′
(
1−
(
ρ¯− 1
ρ¯+ 1 + max(1− γ¯,0)
)2)
≤ W (q
N)
W (q∗)
≤ 1,
where κ′ ≥ 1 is the Jacobian similarity factor. The lower bound is asymptotically tight when the
cost l(q) is an affine function of q and γ¯→ 0. The upper bound is tight with symmetric service
providers and the cost-to-benefit ratio ρ¯=1.
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Figure 2 W (qN)/W (q∗) with respect to spillover cost-to-benefit ratio ρ¯ for symmetric noncompeting service
providers with affine cost.
Remark 2. When there is no spillover cost, i.e., ρ¯= 0, Theorem 2(a) coincides with Theorem
1.
Theorem 2 states that the maximum benefit-to-cost ratio ρ¯ has a critical value at 1 as it has
an opposite impact on the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly depending on whether ρ¯≥ 1. To
illustrate this effect, Figure 2 depicts W (qN)/W (q∗) against ρ¯ for noncompeting service providers
with affine cost κ = κ′ = 1. We set γ¯ to 0 so as to isolate the impact of competition and self-
contained cost from ρ¯. Note that in this case, the upper bound in Theorem 2(a) and the lower
bound in Theorem 2(b) coincide. As shown in Figure 2, efficiency increases with ρ¯ when ρ¯≤ 1 and
decreases after ρ¯ exceeds 1. It is important to take note that even with affine cost, efficiency loss
can be significant with large ρ¯.
To gain some intuitions, when an additional user is enrolled, two types of externalities are
imposed to the society. The positive externality comes from additional consumer surplus through
acquiring the service, whereas the negative externality is due to the existence of spillover cost. By
definition, ρ¯ is the ratio between the marginal spillover cost to the marginal consumer surplus. When
ρ¯ ≤ 1, the marginal consumer surplus outweighs the marginal spillover cost, implying enrolling
an additional user leads to a net positive welfare to the society. As a result, the efficiency of an
regulated oligopoly improves with this quantity. When ρ¯ reaches the critical value of 1, the marginal
spillover is completely offset by consumer surplus and W (qN) =W (q∗). When ρ¯ > 1, with every
additional enrollment, the increase in spillover cost outweighs the welfare gain, resulting in a net
negative welfare change. Therefore, as ρ¯ continues to increase, the gap between the unregulated
setting and the social optimum widens.
We can also use ρ¯ to draw a connection to the optimal access fee and the output level in the unreg-
ulated oligopoly. We have seen in Proposition 1 that when βiiqi >
∑
j 6=i rjiqj or
∑
j 6=i rjiqj/(βiiqi)≤
1, the access fee is a subsidy which aims to promote higher output level. One can show that
with asymmetric service providers, ρ¯≤ 1 indicates that qN ≤ q∗. On the other hand, when βiiqi <
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j 6=i rjiqj, the access fee is a penalty to reduce the output level, implying the existence of conges-
tion in the unregulated oligopoly. This helps to explain the similarity in the efficiency result with
only self-contained costs (Theorem 1) and the setting with spillover costs with ρ¯≤ 1 (Theorem 2a).
In both cases, the unregulated oligopoly is underproducing compared to their optimal counterpart.
Competition among service providers reduces the oligopolistic power and consequently promotes
its efficiency.
With nonlinear spillover costs, we have two Jacobian similarity factors, i.e., κ in the upper bound
for ρ¯≤ 1 and κ′ in the lower bound for ρ¯≥ 1. Their precise definitions are given in Equations (8)
and (18) respectively. The following result provides a more intuitive upper bound which shows
their dependence on the cost structure.
Proposition 5. (a) With spillover costs, the Jacobian similarity factors are bounded by κ ≤
λmax{(ΓNR + RN)−2(Γ∗R + R∗)2}, and κ′ ≤ λmax{(ΓNR + RN)2(Γ∗R + R∗)−2}. When service providers
are symmetric with ui(q) = p¯ − βiqi −
∑
j βjqj and rij = r for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, these bounds
simplify to κ≤
(
l′(q∗)
l′(qN)
)2
and κ′ ≤
(
l′(qN)
l′(q∗)
)2
.
(b) Denote qˆ= p¯
2βi+(n−1)βj as the output level in the unregulated oligopoly without congestion cost.
• For monomial costs, li(q) = c(
∑
j qj)
k, where c > 0 is the constant cost coefficient and k is the
degree of nonlinearity, the Jacobian similarity factor is bounded by κ≤ 22(k−1) and κ′ ≤ ( qˆ
q∗ )
k−1;
• For the M/M/1 model with delay cost, li(q) = cµ−∑j qj , where c is congestion cost per unit
time, µ is the service rate, then κ≤maxi
(
2µ−nq∗
2(µ−nq∗)
)2
and κ′ ≤
(
µ−nq∗
µ−nqˆ
)2
.
The method to find an upper bound for κ without knowing qN is very similar to the setting with
only self-contained cost. We use a lower bound qN ≥ 1/2q∗ because ρ¯≤ 1 indicates that qN ≤ q∗.
To determine κ′, as qN ≥ q∗, we need to provide an upper bound on qN, which is denoted as qˆ.
One such lower bound, which we have used in Proposition 5 is to let qˆ be the output level in the
absence of congestion costs.
In the proof of Theorem 2, we express the Jacobian matrix R as ΓR and Roff (representing the
self-contained and the spillover costs) and show that some steps for Theorem 1 continue to hold.
As the main techniques are similar to what is shown in Section 3.2 and 3.3, we relegate the proof
of Theorem 2 to the Appendix.
5. Simulation Experiments
So far, we have developed several bounds to evaluate the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly.
We show that the bounds are tight for special cases, such as noncompeting service providers or
symmetric service providers with affine costs . This section addresses a natural follow-up question:
How “good” are our bounds for more general cases?
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Two factors affect the tightness of our bounds, namely, nonlinearity of the cost functions and
asymmetry among service providers. In order to pinpoint the individual impact on the bound per-
formance, we first focus on symmetric service providers and evaluate the impact of cost nonlinearity
in Section 5.1. Next, in Section 5.2, we focus on studying the impact of asymmetry among service
providers when the costs are affine functions. Since the performance on the parametric bounds
is similar across different settings, we will illustrate the upper bound result from Theorem 1 in
Sections 5.1 and that from Theorem 2 in Section 5.2.
5.1. Effect of nonlinearity
We conduct two experiments with different nonlinear cost functions for symmetric service providers
to evaluate the impact of nonlinearity of the costs on the tightness of the bounds. In both exper-
iments, for the marginal utility function pi(q) = p¯i− βiiqi +
∑
j 6=i βijqj, we let p¯i = 20, βii = 10 for
all i. We allow βij to take values from [0,1,3,5] for all j 6= i. Increasing the βijs while keeping
the βiis fixed implies that the intensity of competition is increasing. Note that βij = 0 represents
noncompeting service providers.
In the first experiment, we consider a monomial cost function, i.e., li(qi) = ciq
k
i , where ci = 1 is
the constant cost coefficient and the power k denotes the degree of nonlinearity. Figure 3a shows
the actual efficiency ratio W (qN)/W (q∗) for a setting with n= 5 service providers and the upper
bound developed in Theorem 1 against the nonlinearity factor k, depicted by the solid and dashed
lines respectively.
(a) Monomial cost (b) M/M/1 system cost
Figure 3 Simulation experiments illustrate the performance of the bound with respect to nonlinearity. The solid
and dashed lines represent the actual efficiency ratio and the bound respectively.
In the second experiment, we consider the cost function from a standard M/M/1 system, li(qi) =
ci
µi−qi , where ci = 1 denotes the congestion cost per unit time and µi denotes i’s service rate and
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µi = 10 for all i. Besides increasing βijs as we have done in the first experiment, we also vary the
number of service providers from 1 to 20. The exact efficiency ratio and the upper bound are shown
in Figure 3b.
In both experiments, we observe that the worst case for the efficiency loss occurs with non-
competing service providers. The exact efficiency ratio W (qN)/W (q∗) improves as competition
increases, either by increasing the βijs or increasing the number of service providers (except the
case of noncompeting service providers). We also observe from Figure 3b that efficiency increases
from having an additional service provider is more pronounced when there is a fair amount of
competition in the existing market. For example, with βij = 5, when the market expands from a
monopoly (n= 1) to a duopoly (n= 2), the increase in W (qN)/W (q∗) is approximately 9%.
The impact of varying the degree of nonlinearity k in the first experiment is less conclusive. As we
see in Figure 3a, efficiency first decreases then increases with k. However, with competing service
providers, the general trend seems to suggest that the effect of cost nonlinearity on efficiency is
limited as the variations in W (qN)/W (q∗) across k are rather small.
The bounds in both experiments appear to follow the exact ratio quite closely. The error between
the bound and the exact ratio is at its largest with noncompeting service providers. With competing
service providers, the bound becomes considerably tighter as competition intensity increases. Figure
3a shows that with competing service providers, when k ≥ 5, the bound matches the exact ratio
for βij ≥ 3. In Figure 3b, with noncompeting service providers, the error between the bound and
the exact efficiency ratio is about 4%. When βij ≥ 3, the differences are reduced to less than 1%.
5.2. Effect of asymmetry
In this section, we focus on a setting with asymmetric service providers and affine spillover costs
so as to evaluate the performance of the upper bound in Theorem 2 (when ρ¯ ≤ 1). Figure 4
reports the result of a simulation experiment with 500,000 instances. For each instance, a number
corresponding to the number of service providers is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution on
the interval [2, 25]. Next, we generate a random positive vector p¯, a positive definite matrix with
nonnegative elements B and a positive semi-definite matrix R of the corresponding dimension to
represent the asymmetric service providers (R is independent of q since costs are affine).
We first solve the problem in the unregulated and the optimal settings respectively and compute
the exact value for W (qN)/W (q∗). Next, we determine the corresponding upper bound in terms
of γ¯ and ρ¯. We summarize the differences between the exact quantity and the lower bound in the
histogram as shown in Figure 4. The experiment suggests that the upper bound provides a fairly
accurate estimate of the exact quantity. For most of the 500,000 instances, the differences between
the two quantities are within 0.05.
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Figure 4 A simulation experiment to illustrate the strength of the upper bound in Theorem 2 when ρ¯≤ 1. The
x-axis represents the differences between the exact value of W (qN)/W (q∗) and the upper bound grouped in bins.
The y-axis represents the relative frequency of the instances within the bin size.
6. Conclusions
In this work, we have considered a setting where several services providers compete for users who
are sensitive to both prices and congestion by providing multiple differentiated services. We have
shown that in the absence of spillover cost, the unregulated setting could be quite efficient and
the maximum welfare loss is capped at 25%, even with highly nonlinear convex costs. Competition
among service providers promotes efficiency of the unregulated setting. With spillover cost, the
efficiency of the unregulated setting highly depends on the relative magnitude of the marginal
spillover cost and the marginal consumer surplus associated with enrolling an additional user.
When the marginal benefit outweighs the marginal spillover cost, enrolling more users improves the
efficiency of the unregulated setting. On the other hand, when the marginal spillover cost exceeds
the marginal benefit, the loss of efficiency can be potentially severe as it increases with the marginal
spillover costs.
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Appendix. Proofs for the key results
A. Proof of Proposition 1
To determine the optimal access fee t∗ that induces the welfare maximizing output level q∗ = q(t∗), one way
is to use backward induction: Substitute the service providers’ best response function q(t) into the welfare
objective in Equation (3) and maximize it with respect to t. Note that for a given access fee t, the best
response function q(t) must satisfy the equilibrium condition for all i,
p¯i− ti− li(q(t))−
∑
j
βijqj(t)−βiiqi(t)− qi(t)∂li(q(t))/∂qi = 0. (10)
The optimal service level, q∗ or q(t∗), must satisfy the following optimality condition with respect to
Equation (3),
p¯i− li(q)−
∑
j
βijqj −
∑
j
q∗j ∂lj(q)/∂qi = 0. (11)
Since q(t) must also satisfy the condition above, we obtain the desired result by equating Equation (11)
with (10) and solve for ti.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Under Assumptions 1 to 4, the regulator’s problem (3) is a strictly concave optimization problem with respect
to the output level q. The optimality condition for the problem in Equation (3) can be re-written in the
matrix form, ∇W (q) = p¯−Bq− l(q)−Rq = 0, where matrix R denotes the Jacobian matrix of function
l(q). It is important to note that the matrix R depends on the output level q. Since ∇W (q∗) = 0, we get
p¯− l(q∗) = (B + R∗)q∗, or (12)
q∗ = (B + R∗)−1(p¯− l(q∗)). (13)
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Substitute Equation (13) into the welfare objective (Equation 3), we obtain the following:
W (q∗) = (q∗)T
(
p¯− l(q∗)− 1
2
B(B + R∗)−1(p¯− l(q∗))
)
= (q∗)T
(
B
2
+ R∗
)
(B + R∗)−1(p¯− l(q∗))
= (q∗)T
(
B
2
+ R∗
)
q∗.
In the unregulated setting, there is no access fee, i.e., t = 0. To show the existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium, under Assumptions 1 to 3, the strategy space for each service provider is compact and convex.
The payoff function is continuous and concave with respect to his own strategy. Therefore, the existence of
the equilibrium is guaranteed (Debreu 1952). To show uniqueness, the Hessian matrix of the payoff function
can be expressed as −(B + ΓB + R + Hdiag(q)), where H is the Jacobian matrix for (l′i(q), . . . , l′n(q)) with
l′i = ∂li/∂qi, and diag(q) is a nonnegative matrix with q on its diagonal. Thus, under Assumption 1, 2 and 4
(note that Assumption 4 is only needed for the spillover cost case), the uniqueness of the equilibrium follows
from the fact that the Hessian matrix is negative quasi-definite (Rosen 1965).
The equilibrium condition for all service providers in Equation (2) can be written in the matrix form:
p¯−Bq− l(q)−ΓBq−ΓRq, where ΓB and ΓR represent the diagonal matrix of B and R respectively. Since
qN satisfies the equilibrium condition, we obtain
p¯− l(qN) = (B + ΓB + ΓNR)qN, or (14)
qN = (B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)
−1(p¯− l(qN)). (15)
Substituting Equation (15) into the welfare objective gives the welfare achieved in the unregulated setting,
W (qN) = (qN)T
(
p¯− l(qN)− 1
2
B(B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)
−1(p¯− l(qN))
)
= (qN)T (
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)(B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)
−1(p¯− l(qN))
= (qN)T
(
B
2
+ΓB + Γ
N
R
)
qN.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
When costs are fully self-contained, R = ΓR. Comparing the optimality condition (Equation 12) and the
equilibrium condition for the unregulated setting (Equation 14) , it is easy to see qN ≤ q∗ as service providers
take all the costs into account.
To show the lower bound on qN, consider a special case with a monopolist whose cost is independent
of output level, i.e., B = β, l(q) = l, and R = 0. Then, the unregulated problem is reduced to a one-player
concave optimization problem. It is straightforward to show that qN = 1
2
(p¯ − l)/β while the optimum is
q∗ = (p¯− l)/β. We will show that qN/q∗ = 1/2 is the worst case for all convex costs in the proof for Theorem
1 when we prove the bounds on efficiency analysis.
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D. Lemma 4 and its proof
Lemma 4. When each component of the cost fuction l(q) = (l1(q), · · · , ln(q)) is a convex function with
respect to vector q,
(a) (B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
N)qN ≥ (B + R∗+ RN)q∗, and
(b) (B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
∗)qN ≤ (B + 2R∗)q∗.
Remark 3. When the cost function l(q) is an affine function of q, then Jacobian matrix R is independent
from the output level q. The inequalities in Lemma 4 become equalities.
Proof. To show Lemma 4(a), by convexity on the cost function l(q) = (l1(q), · · · , ln(q)),
l(q∗)− l(qN)≥RN(q∗−qN)
⇒ l(q∗)−RNq∗ ≥ l(qN)−RNqN
⇒−l(q∗) + RNq∗ ≤−l(qN) + RNqN.
Adding a positive vector p¯ to both sides maintains the inequality, i.e,
p¯− l(q∗) + RNq∗ ≤ p¯− l(qN) + RNqN.
After substituting the optimality conditions derived in Equation (12) and (14), we obtain
(B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
N)qN ≥ (B + R∗+ RN)q∗.
To establish Lemma 4(b), with a similar argument,
l(qN)− l(q∗)≥R∗(qN−q∗)
⇒ l(qN)−R∗qN ≥ l(q∗)−R∗q∗
⇒ p¯− l(qN) + R∗qN ≤ p¯− l(q∗) + R∗q∗.
We obtain the desired result by substituting the optimality conditions in Equation (12) and (14).
E. Proof for Proposition 4
Without spillover cost, replace R with ΓR in the definition for κ shown in Equation (8), we obtain
κ≤λmax{(B + ΓB + 2ΓNR)−2(B + ΓB + 2Γ∗R)2
(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R
)(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R
)−1
}
≤λmax{(B + ΓB + 2ΓNR)−2(B + ΓB + 2Γ∗R)2}λmax{
(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R
)(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R
)−1
}. (16)
κ is upper bounded by the maximum eigenvalue of a composite matrix, which is further bounded by the
product of two maximum eigenvalues.
Since we have shown that qN ≤ q∗ in Proposition 3, by monotonicity of cost functions, we obtain
ΓNR ≤ Γ∗R. As the result, the second maximum eigenvalue in Equation (16) must be less than 1. Thus,
κ ≤ λmax{(B + ΓB + 2ΓNR)−2(B + ΓB + 2Γ∗R)2}. Since B + ΓB is positive definite and we know that the
first maximum eigenvalue in Equation (16) is greater than 1, we can further bound the eigenvalue by κ≤
λmax{((ΓNR)−1Γ∗R)2}. Since ΓR is a diagonal matrix, we obtain κ≤maxi
(
l′i(q
∗
i )
l′
i
(qN
i
)
)2
.
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Since costs are monotone, if we can lower bound qN with a quantity q˜, we then have a lower bound on
l′i(q
N
i ) and show that κ≤maxi
(
l′i(q
∗
i )
l′
i
(q˜i)
)2
. From Proposition 3, we set q˜ = q∗/2 and obtain the desired result.
With a monomial cost, the marginal cost is given by l′i(qi) = cikq
k−1
i . Thus, κ can be bounded by 1≤ κ≤
maxi
(
cikq
∗
i
cikq˜i
)2(k−1)
= maxi(
q∗i
q˜i
)2(k−1) = 22(k−1), where k is the degree of nonlinearity. With affine cost where
the nonlinearity degree k= 1, the Jacobian similarity factor κ= 20 = 1.
With congestion cost from a M/M/1 system, the marginal cost is given by l′i(qi) =
ci
(µi−qi)2 . Thus, the
Jacobian similarity factor is bounded by κ≤maxi
(
µi−q˜i
µi−q∗i
)2
= maxi
(
2µi−q∗i
2(µi−q∗i )
)2
. In general, one can find a
tighter bound on the Jacobian similarity factor κ by providing a tighter lower bound on qN.
F. Proof for the lower bound in Theorem 2
The analysis with spillover costs depends on the matrix Ξ = Γ−0.5B RoffΓ
−0.5
B . It is a symmetric matrix and
is similar to Γ−1B Roff , which shares the same set of eigenvalues. Note that matrix Ξ is not positive definite
because it has all 0s on its diagonal. Since Ξ is a nonnegative matrix, by the Perron-Frobenius theorem, we
have |λ{Ξ}| ≤ λmax{Ξ}, where λmax{Ξ} is real and nonnegative. In other words, the maximum eigenvalue of
Ξ indicates its spectral radius. By the Gergsgorin Disc Theorem, this eigenvalue can be bounded as follows.
λmax{Ξ}= λmax{Γ−1B Roff} ≤max
i
∑
j 6=i rji
βii
= max
i
ρi = ρ¯. (17)
That is, the maximum cost-to-benefit ratio, ρ¯, upper bounds the spectral radius of matrix Ξ. In particular,
when ρ¯≤ 1, i.e., λmax{Ξ} ≤ 1. It implies that the matrix I−Ξ is positive semidefinite, where I is the identity
matrix. However, one cannot make a similar claim on Ξ− I when ρ¯ ≥ 1, because Ξ can have negative
eigenvalues.
F.1. Lower bound for ρ¯≤ 1
The bulk of the analysis to derive the constant lower bound is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1. In
fact, the first two steps are nearly identical as we express the Jacobian matrix R to be its diagonal and off-
diagonal components ΓR and Roff and follow through the steps shown in Section 3.2. We do need to modify
the last step. Since I−Ξ is positive definite, the expression for the composite matrix could be simplified to
(G + I + Ξ)− 2(I−Ξ) = G− I + Ξ. Since this matrix is nonnegative, it is copositive and we have obtained
the desired result.
F.2. Lower bound for ρ¯≥ 1
Denote Σ = B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
N and Φ = B + R∗+ RN. From Lemma 4, we get ΣqN ≥Φq∗. Note the vectors
on both sides of the inequality are nonnegative. By Proposition 2, we obtain the following,
W (qN) = (qN)T ( 1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)q
N = (qN)TΣΣ−1( 1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)Σ
−1ΣqN.
Replacing ΣqN with Φq∗, we obtain a lower bound on W (qN), i.e.,
W (qN)≥(q∗)TΦΣ−1(1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)Σ
−1Φq∗
=(q∗)T (B + R∗+ RN)(B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
N)−1(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)
(B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
N)−1(B + R∗+ RN)q∗.
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By making using of the Jacobian similarity properties on matrices ΓNR and R
N, there exists κ′ ≥ 1 such that
W (qN)≥ 1
κ′
(q∗)T (B + R∗+ R∗)(B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R + R
∗)−1(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R)
(B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R + R
∗)−1(B + R∗+ R∗)q∗
=
1
κ′
(q∗)T (B + 2R∗)(B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R + R
∗)−1(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R)
(B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R + R
∗)−1(B + 2R∗)q∗.
Note that by using the definition of the minimum eigenvalue of a positive semidefinite matrix, one way to
bound 1/κ′ is shown as follows,
1
κ′
≥λmin{(B + R∗+ RN)2(B + 2R∗)−2(B + ΓB + ΓNR + RN)−2(B + ΓB + Γ∗R + R∗)2
(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R)
−1},
or equivalently,
κ′ ≤λmax{(B + R∗+ RN)−2(B + 2R∗)2(B + ΓB + ΓNR + RN)2(B + ΓB + Γ∗R + R∗)−2
(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)
−1(
1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R)}, (18)
Combine the result with W (q∗), notice that it is all in the optimal q∗ space, therefore we will drop the
superscript in this proof. Denote B˜ = B + 2ΓR,
W (qN)
W (q∗)
≥ 1
κ′
(q∗)T (B˜ + 2Roff )(B˜ + ΓB + Roff )−1(B˜ + 2ΓB)(B˜ + ΓB + Roff )−1(B˜ + 2Roff )q∗
(q∗)T (B˜ + 2Roff )q∗
.
Denote G = Γ−0.5B B˜Γ
−0.5
B and Ξ = Γ
−0.5
B RoffΓ
−0.5
B , the expression becomes
W (qN)
W (q∗)
≥ 1
κ′
(q∗)TG0.5(G + 2Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1(G + 2I)(G + I + Ξ)−1(G + 2Ξ)G0.5q∗
(q∗)TG0.5(G + 2Ξ)G0.5q∗
.
Using the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem, a lower bound is given by the minimum eigenvalue of the following
composite matrix,
W (qN)
W (q∗)
≥ 1
κ′
λmin{(G + 2I)(G + I + Ξ)−1(G + 2Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1}
=
1
κ′
(
1−λmax{((I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1))2}
)
.
The goal is to find an upper bound on λmax{((I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1))2}, which depends on the eigenvalues
of G and Ξ. Since matrix G is a nonnegative and positive definite matrix,
λmax{((I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1))2} ≤ max
i∈{1,...,n}
(
1−λi{Ξ}
λmin{G}+λi{Ξ}+ 1
)2
.
Consider a function f(x) = (1−x)2/(y+x+ 1)2. When x> 1, f(x) increases in x. Thus, when λmax{Ξ}> 1,
λmax{((I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1))2} ≤
(
λmax{Ξ}− 1
λmin{G}+λmax{Ξ}+ 1
)2
. (19)
We have obtained an upper bound on λmax{Ξ} in Equation (17). To determine the minimum eigenvalue of
G, we see that λmin{G}= λmin{Γ−1B B + 2Γ−1B ΓR} ≥ λmin{Γ−1B B}, since Γ−1B ΓR is a nonnegative diagonal
matrix. By the Gershgorin Disc theorem, λmin{Γ−1B B} ≥ 1−maxi
∑
j 6=i βij
βii
≥ 1−maxi
∑
j 6=i βij+2rii
βii
= 1− γ¯.
Meanwhile, since G is a positive definite matrix, λmin{G}> 0. We conclude that λmin{G} ≥max(1− γ¯,0).
Substitute the bounds we have on λmin{G} and λmax{Ξ} into Equation (19), we have obtained the desired
lower bound for ρ¯ > 1.
Author: Price of Anarchy for Cournot Competition in Service Industries with Congestion
32 Management Science 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS
G. Proof for the upper bound in Theorem 2
The proof has three main steps and the two steps are identical to what have been shown in the proof for the
upper bound in Theorem 1. We only need to modify the last step as follows. In Lemma 3, we have established
an upper bound on the comparison of welfare achieved in the two settings in the terms of eigenvalues of a
composite matrix, i.e.,
W (qN)
W (q∗)
≤ κ(1−λmin{((I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1))2}).
Note matrix G is positive definite and the minimum eigenvalue of the composite matrix is bounded below
by
λmin{((I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1))2 ≥min
λ{Ξ}
(
λ{Ξ}− 1
λmax{G}+ 1 +λ{Ξ}
)2
.
Consider a function g(x, y) = ((x− 1)(x+ y+ 1))2 with x∈ [x, x¯]. If x¯≤ 1, the function decreases in x. Thus,
for a fixed y, the minimum of the function is achieved at x¯. Therefore, we obtain the following.
When λmax{Ξ} ≤ 1,
λmin{((I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1))2 ≥
(
λmax{Ξ}− 1
λmax{G}+ 1 +λmax{Ξ}
)2
.
Since λmax{Ξ} ≤ ρ¯ and λmax{G} ≤ 1+ γ¯, we can further lower bound the eigenvalue of the composite matrix
by
λmin{((I−Ξ)(G + I + Ξ)−1))2 ≥
(
ρ¯− 1
γ¯+ 2 + ρ¯
)2
.
To obtain the tightness result, note that with symmetric service providers, λmax{Ξ}= ρ¯ and all the steps
become equalities.
H. Proof for Proposition 5
With spillover cost, when ρ¯≤ 1, it implies that qN ≤ q∗ and RN ≤R∗. Using the same argument in Lemma
4, an upper bound on κ is given by λmax{(ΓNR + RN)−2(Γ∗R + R∗)2}. When service providers are symmetric
with costs rij = r for all i and j, R is a rank-1 matrix with two distinct eigenvalues, i.e., nr and 0. Then it
is straightforward to show that the bound on κ reduces to (l′(q∗)/l′(qN))2. Thus, one can determine κ by
substituting a lower bound on qN such as qN ≥ 1/2q∗.
Another Jacobian similarity factor, κ′, is defined in Equation (18). Note that an upper bound on κ′
can be written as the product of the maximum eigenvalue of three matrices, (B + R∗+ RN)−2(B + 2R∗)2,
(B + ΓB + Γ
N
R + R
N)2(B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R + R
∗)−2 and ( 1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
N
R)
−1( 1
2
B + ΓB + Γ
∗
R). Clearly, when R
∗ =
RN, they are all reduced to an identity matrix with eigenvalues equal to 1. When ρ¯ > 1, the unreg-
ulated setting is overproducing, thus, RN > R∗. Thus, the maximum eigenvalue of the first and the
third matrix is less than 1 and we can bound κ′ by λmax{(B + ΓB + ΓNR + RN)2(B + ΓB + Γ∗R + R∗)−2} ≤
λmax{(ΓNR + RN)2(Γ∗R + R∗)−2}. Using the same argument as above, when service providers are symmetric,
the bound on κ′ simplifies to (l′(qN)/l′(q∗))2. It can be further bounded by replacing qN with an upper
bound qˆ. One such example is to compute the output level when costs are zero, i.e., qˆ = (B + ΓB)
−1p¯, which
is equivalent to qˆ= p¯
2βi+(n−1)βj for the symmetric case.
